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DISCRIMINATION BY MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS:
RECOGNIZING AGENT LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
ScoTT B. GOLDBERG t
[T]he party whose voluntary conduct has caused the
damage should suffer, rather than one who has had no
share in producing it.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes'
INTRODUCTION
The principle of personal accountability is deeply rooted in the
American legal tradition.2 Although liability of indirectly responsi-
ble parties is appropriate under certain circumstances, liability of
the actual wrongdoer is generally a prerequisite, especially in the
employment context.' In the context of employment discrimina-
tion, however, several federal courts have held otherwise.
4
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII), enacted to
combat employment discrimination and compensate its victims,6
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OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 84 (1881).
2 See e.g., id. at 80-84 (discussing various tort liability theories, which "seem[] to
be adopted by some of the greatest common-law authorities").
' Employers may be held liable for torts committed by their agents while acting
within the scope of employment, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958),
but employer liability in no way supersedes the liability of the culpable agent. See id.
§ 343.
4 See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
s 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6 The United States Supreme Court has pronounced that the primary objectives
of Title VII are eliminating discrimination from the workplace and compensating em-
ployment discrimination victims. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
417-18 (1975) (describingTitle VII's purposes of achievingequal employment oppor-
tunity, removing discriminatory employment barriers, and creating remedies to
redress unlawful employment discrimination); see also Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant
Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("Title VII always has served two
(571)
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prohibits racial and sexual harassment and discriminatory practices
affecting hiring, firing, compensation, and benefits.7 Although
Title VII explicitly permits victims of discrimination to seek both
injunctive relief and damages,' the statute fails to specify precisely
whom victims may sue for such relief.9 Consequently, the federal
judiciary has been required to make this determination.
In practice, federal courts readily hold liable employers i° who
are proven to have violated Title VII. 1 Unlawfully discriminatory
acts, however, often emanate from agents of employers acting
within the scope of their employment, such as when a chief
executive officer of a major corporation makes a racially based
hiring decision.12 In such cases, federal courts agree that employ-
purposes: to compensate the victims of discrimination.., and to deter discrimina-
tion.... ."); cf Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor
Under Title VII. Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
24 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 41, 42 (1993) (identifying the objectives of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.), as eliminating discrimination and compensating its victims).
7 Title VII prohibits discrimination regarding "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment" on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also 2 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE B.
LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILrIY §§ 5.09-.15 (1994)
(discussing the types of discrimination Title VII prohibits).
' Remedies available under Title VII include compensatory and punitive damages.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). If appropriate, equitable relief is also
available in the form of back pay, reinstatement, or injunction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g).
' Neither Title VII nor its amendments explicitly state which entities are subject
to liability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
" This Comment uses the term "employer" in its ordinary sense to denote the cor-
poration or entity employing the party against whom discrimination is directed. For
Title VII's definition of "employer," see infra part I.A.
" See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993) (holding that
Title VII awards damages "against employers who are proven to have taken
[discriminatory] employment action").
12 Title VII does not define the term "agent," see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17,
and legislative history does not reveal its intended meaning. See Carrillo, supra note
6, at 53. Federal courts have, nonetheless, been fairly consistent in defining who con-
stitutes an agent within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake
County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an "'individual qualifies as
an "employer" under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exer-
cises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing, or conditions of employ-
ment'" (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989)));
Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1986) (defining "agent" as anyone
who "participated in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the discrimi-
nation" (citations omitted)); York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360,
362 (6th Cir. 1982) (dictum) (defining"agent" as an "employee to whom employment
decisions have been delegated by the employer"). The crucial inquiry generally
involves the level of authority an employee has over the conditions of employment
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ers may be held liable for the acts of their agents. 3 Whether
agents who actually discriminate may also be held liable, however,
remains unresolved.14 This issue has sharply divided the federal
courts of appeals 15 and district courts,1 6 thus leaving the doctrines
of other employees. See, e.g., Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125 (referring to the defendant
supervisor as a "paradigm example" of an agent because the supervisor had ultimate
authority over employment and working conditions); Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442 (de-
termining the agency of two superiors based on the authority they exerted over work
assignments and staffing, as well as the fact that they filed a report that led to the
plaintiff's suspension). Some courts seem to require that an agent be a supervisor or
manager. See e.g., Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125 (implying that only supervisors are agents);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (same).
" See Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enters., 816 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (concluding that plaintiffs may generally secure "the full measure of available
relief" under Title VII from employers for the actions of their agents); Barger v.
Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D. Kan. 1985) (noting that public employers can almost
always be sued for the Title VII actions of their agents); see also Vakharia v. Swedish
Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785-86 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (observing that employer
liability is generally permissible under Title VII and that "personal accountability of
supervisory employees is [necessary to achieve] Title V[II]'s broader goal of eradi-
cating discrimination"). But see infra part II.A.1 (discussing the unavailability of
vicarious liability in certain cases of sexual harassment).
14 As used throughout this Comment, "liability" is synonymous with "personal lia-
bility." Courts occasionally use confusing nomenclature that obscures distinctions
between suing agents personally and suing agents in their official capacities. See, e.g.,
Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that public officials may
be liable "in [their] official capacities only" under Title VII). Suits against agents in
their official capacities, however, are in fact suits against their employers. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) ("Official capacity suits... 'generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.'" (citations omitted)); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 n.55 (1978) (same, in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Sauers, 1 F.3d at
1125 (applying Graham in the Title VII context); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d
764,776 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); Stafford v. Missouri, 835 F. Supp. 1136, 1149 (W.D.
Mo. 1993) (citing Graham); cf. Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F.
Supp. 579, 586-87 (D.S.C. 1983) (applying Monell in the context of age discrimina-
tion).
" The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have determined that Title VII permits agent
liability, see Paroline, 879 F.2d at.104;Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231
(6th Cir. 1986), but the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have reached the oppo-
site conclusion. See Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125; Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d
583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); Busby, 931 F.2d at 772.
Although the Fifth Circuit has considered the issue of agent liability, inconsistent
rulings cast doubt on its current position. Compare Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 442-43
(holding two agents liable for Title VII violations after specifically addressing the
permissibility of doing so) with Harvey, 913 F.2d at 227-28 (holding that agents may
not be held liable under Title VII) and Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d
1084, 1099 & n.19 (5th Cir. Unit AJuly 1981) (holding that public officials cannot be
liable for back pay under Title VII). Harvey is the more recent decision, but the Fifth
Circuit's continued adherence to a self-imposed rule "that no panel of this circuit can
overrule a decision previously made by another [panel]" implies that Hamilton
1994]
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defining Title VII liability in a state of disarray.
17
This Comment analyzes the issue of agent liability under Title
VII and concludes that managers and supervisors who unlawfully
discriminate should be held personally accountable to their vic-
tims."8 Part I demonstrates that the plain language of Title VII
provides a basis for agent liability. Part II examines the legislative
intent underlying Title VII and determines that agent liability com-
ports with Title VII's statutory objectives. Part III evaluates the
public policy implications of holding agents liable under Title VII
and concludes that recognizing agent liability under Title VII is
desirable.
remains good law. Harvey, 913 F.2d at 228 n.2 (citing Ryals v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 904,
906 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981)). In Harvey, the Fifth Circuit attempted to reconcile these
inconsistent rulings by stating that the Hamilton court made no distinction between
the agent's official and unofficial capacity. See id. The Harvey court's reasoning is
unpersuasive, however, because the Hamilton court explicitly held that agents may be
found personally liable. See Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443 ("To hold otherwise would
encourage [agents] to believe that they may violate Title VII with impunity." (emphasis
added)).
16 District courts within the Second and Seventh Circuits continue to reach
opposite conclusions regarding agent liability, apparently refusing to follow their
respective courts of appeals, which have upheld agent liability without explicitly
addressing the issue. See Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1322-24 (2d Cir.)
(upholding liability of an agent owning 98% of employer company), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 467 (1992); Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
Compare, e.g., Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172,1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(recognizing agent liability) with Friend v. Union Dime Say. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1307, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dictum) (rejecting agent liability); compare also
Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 784 (recognizing agent liability) with Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP,
828 F. Supp. 525, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting agent liability) and Weiss v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. II1. 1991) (same).
Inconsistency abounds among district courts in the remaining circuits. See Henry
v. E.G. & G. Mo. Metals Shaping Co., 837 F. Supp. 312, 314 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (declin-
ing to recognize agent liability because of lack of "clear direction" from "sister courts
or the appellate court"). Compare e.g., Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F.
Supp. 526, 529 (D.N.H. 1993) (recognizing agent liability) with Stafford, 835 F. Supp.
at 1149 (rejecting agent liability).
" On this very issue of agent liability under Title VII, the United States Supreme
Court has twice recently denied certiorari, first to the United States Court ofAppeals
for the Ninth Circuit, see Miller v. La Rosa, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994), and second to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, see Grant v. Lone Star Co., 115
S. Ct. 574 (1994).
18 This Comment focuses solely on disparate treatment violations. Whether the
analysis employed herein might prove useful for determining agent liability in the
disparate impact context is therefore beyond the scope of this Comment.
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I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE PROVIDES A BASIS FOR
AGENT LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
According to the United States Supreme Court's longstanding
pronouncement on statutory construction, "the meaning of a statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the
act is framed."19 As the following sections demonstrate, federal
courts have disagreed on the meaning of Title VII's language. A
literal reading of Title VII supports agent liability, although some
courts have used more indirect readings of the statute to reach the
opposite conclusion. The reasoning of these courts is flawed,
however, and therefore the literal reading of the statute should
prevail.
A. A Literal Reading of Title VII Supports Agent Liability
Title VII does not state explicitly who may be held liable for
violating its prohibitions." Federal courts implicitly recognize that
the statutory provisions defining unlawful employment practices
most directly indicate which discriminators fall within the ambit of
statutory liability.21 Such provisions delineate the conduct that
constitutes "an unlawful employment practice for an employer."
22
Accordingly, exposure to liability turns upon who is "an employer"
within the meaning of the statute, which is defined as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees ... and any agent of such person."2 Thus, simply
substituting the statutory definition of employer into the provisions
defining unlawful employment practices plainly establishes a basis
for agent liability.
24
19 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing
the importance of statutory language to the process of statutory construction).
2 See supra note 9.
21 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
24 Many courts permit agent liability solely on this basis. See, e.g., Goodman v.
Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. 524, 498 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (allowing agent liability based on the language of Title VII); cf. House v.
Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 161-62 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (using the same
approach in the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
Quite surprisingly, some courts have interpreted § 2000e-2 as prohibiting agent
liability. See e.g., Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding
1994]
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B. Alternate Readings of Title VII's Language Are Flawed
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recent-
ly espoused the various rationales of those federal courts rejecting
a literal reading of Title VII. 25 As the following sections demon-
strate, each of these rationales is logically flawed and therefore fails
to provide a persuasive reason for denying agent liability.
1. Title VII's Definition of "Employer" Does Not Provide a
Persuasive Reason for Rejecting Agent Liability
a. Interpreting Title VII's Inclusion of "Agents"
The explicit inclusion of agents within Title VII's definition of
"employer" suggests, by simple substitution, that agents may be held
liable for their unlawfully discriminatory conduct.26 Some federal
courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit, have nonetheless used the
identical provision to reach the opposite conclusion. Employing a
representative approach, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
"'obvious purpose of [including "agent" in the definition of em-
ployer] was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the
statute,'" not to provide a basis for agent liability."
This approach to resolving the issue of agent liability under Title
that Title VII addresses conduct of employers and not of agents) (citing Clanton v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d 1084, 1099 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). It is
difficult to reconstruct the reasoning behind these decisions, unless perhaps these
courts ignored or overlooked the statutory definition of "employer." Courts subse-
quently considering such cases have rejected the reasoning of those courts that have
prohibited agent liability. See, e.g., Barger v. Kansas, 630 F. Supp. 88, 91 (D. Kan.
1985) (describing the court's reasoning in Padway as "clearly erroneous"); see also
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (conceding that
readings of Title VII that permit agent liability would not be "without merit," but
rejecting agent liability nonetheless), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
2-5 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88. The Fifth Circuit referentially adopted these
rationales by accepting the reasoning ofMillerin Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649,
652-53 (5th Cir.) (declining to impose agent liability), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574
(1994).
26 See supra part L.A (finding support for agent liability in the plain language of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e).27 Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (quoting the unpublished opinion of the district court
below). The doctrine of respondeat superior liability, a form of vicarious liability,
permits employers to be held strictly liable for the torts of their agents under certain
circumstances. See W. PACE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984); W. EDWARD SELL, AGENCY §§ 95-96; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 3, § 219 (discussing the circumstances under which
employers may be held liable for the torts of their employees).
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VII is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit cited
no authority to support its assertion other than the unpublished
opinion of the district court below. 28 Second, even assuming that
Congress included the word "agent" for respondeat superior pur-
poses, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended suits
against employers to constitute the exclusive means of Title VII
liability. 29 Such a conclusion is especially dubious given that a lit-
eral reading of the statute dictates a contrary outcome and thus
does not weigh in favor of denying agent liability under Title VII.30
b. Interpreting Title Vii's Exclusion of Employers with Fewer Than
Fifteen Employees
The Ninth Circuit's second rationale for rejecting agent liability
focuses on Title VII's coverage of only those employers with fifteen
or more employees."1 After assuming that Congress would intend
to treat individuals and small entities similarly, the court concluded
that, given the statute's protection of small businesses, it would be
"inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run
against [agents]."3 2
The logical error of this analysis lies in its improper assessment
of the reasons Congress limited Title VII's coverage to larger
employers. As some federal courts have recognized, legislative
history reveals that Congress excluded small employers from Title
VII's coverage to preserve the autonomy of family-run businesses
that prefer to hire friends and family members."3 This rationale,
28 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. The district court opinion cannot be accessed by
electronic database.
2 Given that Congress never addressed the issue of agent liability, see infra note
43, it seems especially tenuous for the court to have eliminated one of two equally
plausible-and mutually compatible-constructions of the statute's inclusion of agents
without invoking significant supporting authority.
" See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 737 (1993) (recognizing the "well
established rule that the plain language of the enacted text is the best indicator of
intent"); supra part L.A (finding a basis for agent liability in Title VII's plain language).
sI See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (stating that businesses
with fewer than 15 employees are not covered under Title Vii's prohibitions); supra
text accompanying note 23.
32 Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
.s See Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp., 834 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H. 1993)
(explaining the 15-employee limitation as a device used "to protect small family-run
businesses from discriminatory hiring claims based on their preference for hiring
friends and relatives" (citing Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 n.4 (6th Cir.
1983) and legislative history)). The court specifically relied on the congressional
debates over the 1972 amendments to Title VII, particularly the remarks of Senator
1994]
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however, does not apply to individual agents. Congress's intent to
preserve a sphere of autonomy for small businesses does not suggest
that Congress would similarly protect individual discriminators,
especially when these individuals are agents of em-ployers covered
by Title VII. Rather, agents of covered employers are acutely
involved in the business decisions Congress intended Title VII to
reach. 4 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, then, Congress
would not have intended violators within covered enterprises to
escape the consequences of their actions.
2. Title VII's Damage Limitation Provisions Do Not Provide a
Legitimate Reason for Rejecting Agent Liability
The Ninth Circuit also based its denial of agent liability on the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which both authorized
compensatory and punitive damages and limited the size of such
awards according to the number of people employed by the liable
defendant.3 5 After correctly noting that no provision explicitly
limits damage awards against individuals,3 6 the court concluded
that Congress never envisioned agent liability under Title VII."
This interpretation's appeal lies in its ability to prevent the
potentially unjust result of imposing even greater liability on an
Fannin, see 118 CONG. REc. 2409-10 (1972), and Senator Ervin, see id. at 3171 (1972).
See Lamirande, 834 F. Supp. at 528.
" See supra note 12 (noting the importance of decision-making authority as a
factor in judicial interpretation of the term "agent").
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (authorizing compensatory and
punitive damage awards, but only in cases of "unlawful intentional discrimination,"
as opposed to disparate impact cases). The damage limitation provisions stipulate:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section ... and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section,
shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees .... $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees .... $100,000;
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees .... $200,000;
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees ....
$300,000.
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
"' The damage limitation provisions apply only to defendants with "more than 14
•.. employees." Id.
37 See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2 (concluding that if Congress intended to
permit agent liability, it would have created a damage category encompassing respon-
dents without employees, that is, a category covering individual agents).
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agent than on the employer, who often would have greater financial
resources than the individual agents it employs. 
8
Title VII's silence regarding the range of damages available
against this class of potential defendants does not, however, indicate
that Congress intended to foreclose agent liability. The damage
limitation provisions are also silent with respect to other Title VII
defendants whose exposure to liability remains uncontroversial. In
particular, the damage limitation provisions do not expressly cover
employment agencies and labor organizations having under fifteen
employees, despite Title VII's undisputed coverage of such entities
regardless of their size. 9 It would seem disingenuous to argue
that Congress intended its silence on damage limitations regarding
these potential defendants to nullify the content of statutory
provisions specifically directed at them. Similarly, legislative silence
does not indicate that Congress intended to leave agents outside
Title VII's reach.4" Because all alternative readings of Title VII's
language prove unpersuasive," the literal reading, which supports
" The courts, however, are fully capable of preventing unjust results. In one case
involvinga suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213
(Supp. V 1993), a district court read § 1981a as limiting the damages for which the
agent could be liable to the extent of the employer's damage exposure. See EEOC v.
AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 577 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting the
"purely mechanical" argument that § 1981a imposes no limitation on damages against
agents because agents lack the requisite number of employees).
9 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e(c)-(d) (defining the terms "employment agency" and "labor
organization"). Title VII defines unlawful employment practices for employment
agencies and labor organizations at 42 U.S.C. §§ 200Oe-2(b) to 2000e-2(d) and
§§ 2000e-3(a) to 2000e-3(b).
40 Even if agents constituted the only class having less than 15 employees to which
Title VII potentially applies, commonly accepted principles of statutory construction
nonetheless would undermine the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the damage
limitation provisions. Under such a scenario, the words "more than 14... employ-
ees" would be superfluous if damages were not available against individuals, because
employers with less than 15 employees fall outside Title VII's coverage. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Such an interpretation should therefore be re-
jected, because statutory interpretation should give meaning to all the words in any
given piece of legislation. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (recognizing the
preference for statutory interpretations which give meaning to all words); 2A SINGER,
supra note 19, § 46.06 (discussing the pervasiveness of the rule that statutes should
be read to avoid rendering portions superfluous).
41 The Ninth Circuit advanced a third, but equally flawed, rationale for rejecting
agent liability. Relying on its 1982 opinion in Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968
(9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit concluded that Title VII's original remedies of back
pay, reinstatement, and injunctive relief apply to employers but not to individuals.
See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. Similarly, the court extrapolated, the statute does not
impose liability on agents. See id. (citing Padway, 665 F.2d at 968).
Since the Padway decision, however, Congress has changed Title VII's remedial
1994]
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agent liability under Title VII, remains the most compelling.
42
II. AGENT LIABILITY FURTHERS THE CONGRESSIONAL
OBJECTIVES OF TITLE VII
Because Title VII's language does not unambiguously resolve the
issue of agent liability, one must look to the statute's legislative
history for further guidance.4" Although Congress never specifical-
ly addressed the issue of agent liability,"4 Title VII's broad objec-
tives are clear: to eradicate employment discrimination and to
provide redress for the victims of such discrimination.45  The
following sections consider whether agent liability serves these dual
scheme to authorize compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional dis-
crimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A, 105 Stat.
1071, 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993)). The statutory
amendment has called into question the extent to which courts should rely on pre-
1991 decisions as authority for current Title VII analyses of agent liability. Compare
Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (rejecting
pre-1991 Title VII decisions as authority on the issue of agent liability) with Miller,
991 F.2d at 587 & n.2 (citing Padway's pre-199 1 interpretation of Title VII as
authority on the issue of agent liability).
Although subsequent changes to remedial provisions do not necessarily alter the
coverage of the statute, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 461
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for using a remedial provision
of an amendment to expand a statute's coverage), the reasoning ofpre-1991 decisions
should nonetheless be rejected for their faulty logic. These decisions, which reject
agent liability on the assumption that equitable relief applies only to employers, see
Padway, 665 F.2d at 968, fail to recognize that injunctive orders can be directed
appropriately at agents. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (limiting injunctive relief to a corporate employer
because the court expected two agents of the employer to comply, and becabse the
court wished to avoid the inconvenience of releasing the agents from the order when
their employment with the corporation eventually terminated).
42 See supra part LA (discussing the plain meaning of the unlawful employer
practice provisions of the statute).
41 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (discussing the role
of legislative history in deciphering legislative intent); see also 2A SINGER, supra note
19, § 45.05 (noting a virtual consensus among scholars andjudges that courts should
interpret statutes in light of legislative intent).
44 See Charles S. Mishkind & Louise B. Wright,Joinder of Individual Defendants in
Employment Litigation: Is RemovalStill Possible, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 117, 126 (1993)
(noting that Title VII's legislative history is "silent" on point of agent liability).
' Commonly accepted principles of statutory interpretation dictate that, for issues
not expressly considered by Congress, the legislature's general purposes in enacting
the statute provide the best indication of legislative intent. See 2A SINGER, supra note
19, § 45.09 (suggesting that "[lI]egislative purpose may... be a valuable guide to deci-
sion" for situations unforeseen by the legislature and for situations not unambiguous-
ly resolved by statutory language); see also supra note 6 (discussing Title VII's
objectives).
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purposes, concluding in the affirmative.
A. Agent Liability Helps Victims Secure Compensation
Absent agent liability, victims of discrimination must resort to
suing the wrongdoer's employer alone. The following subsections
explain why employer liability is often insufficient to ensure
compensation for victims of unlawful discrimination, particularly in
the contexts of agents engaging in hostile environment sexual
harassment, judgment-proof employers, and litigation-shy victims.
In these situations, suing agents may provide victims realistic
opportunities for compensation, especially when agents are high-
ranking company executives with significant wealth.
1. Agent Liability Is Needed in Cases of Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment
Although courts routinely hold employers vicariously liable for
most Title VII violations committed by their agents,46 vicarious
liability often does not extend to the disturbingly common Title VII
violation of hostile environment sexual harassment,47 first recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson.48 In Meritor, the Court specifically refused to approve a
strict rule of vicarious liability for employers.49 The Court instead
held that common-law agency principles "place some limits on the
acts of [agents] for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible."" A determination of employer liability consequently
46 See Carrillo, supra note 6, at 75 (stating that hostile environment sexual
harassment is the only type of Title VII violation for which employers are not always
held vicariously liable).
17 Surveys conducted in recent years suggest that sexual harassment occurs with
alarming frequency. See ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1.1 (1990) (summarizing the results of various surveys measuring the
frequency of sexual harassment).
48 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986). The Supreme Court recognized both hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment and quid pro quo sexual harassment as Title VII violations
in Meritor. See id. at 65-67, 73. Hostile environment sexual harassment refers to the
creation of unpleasant or offensive working conditions for an employee based on the
employee's gender. See id. at 64-67 (defining hostile environment sexual harassment);
see also MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 249-55 (practitioner's
ed. 1988) (discussing generally both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment).49 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
' Id. This result falls short of implying that no Title VII violation has occurred,
however, because employer notice of unlawful conduct exposes the employer to
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depends upon "the circumstances of a particular case."5 1
The Meritor Court specifically directed lower courts to common-
law agency principles found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
5 2
which provides that employers are "not subject to liability for the
torts of [agents] acting outside the scope of their employment.""5
Although lower courts have inconsistently identified the conditions
giving rise to vicarious liability,54 employers certainly are not
always vicariously liable for sexual harassment by their agents.55
Agent liability, therefore, furthers the congressional goal of
compensating the victims of discrimination by providing a defen-
dant against whom a plaintiff realistically can prevail in cases in
which doctrinal gaps foreclose recovery against employers.
liability for the identical conduct. See id. at 71-72.
51 Id. at 73; see also William L. Kandel, Financial Exposure ofManagersfor Personnel
Decisions, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 267, 272 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of strict employer liability for unlawful discriminatory acts of their agents). But
see Carrillo, supra note 6, at 76 (arguing Meritor implies that agents act outside the
scope of their employment authority when creating a sexually hostile environment,
thereby exempting the employer from liability under common-law agency principles).
52 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 3, § 219(2) (emphasis added).
This general rule admits four exceptions: (1) the employer intended the conduct or
the consequences; (2) the employer was negligent or reckless; (3) the conduct violated
a nondelegable duty of the employer; and (4) the agent purported to act or speak on
behalfof the principal, and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or the agent
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship. See
id.
4 See Carrillo, supra note 6, at 71-74 (discussing the various ways lower courts
have interpreted Meritor); see also Brian P. Conway, Comment, A View Against Strict
Employer Liability Under Title VII for Sexually Offensive Work Environments Created by
Supervisory Personnel Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 91 DICK. L. REv. 1157, 1175
(1987) (stating that Meritor left the issue of vicarious liability "in a state of turmoil").
55 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73 (holding that employers are not strictly liable for
all Title VII violations of their agents); Carrillo, supra note 6, at 57 (arguing that em-
ployers generally are not vicariously liable for hostile environment sexual harassment);
see also Kandel, supra note 51, at 272 (discussing the liability "gap" created by Meritor).
But see Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 751-52 (3d Cir. 1990)
(imputing to the employer acts of supervisory employees who had the power to hire,
fire, and promote); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
employer strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory employees who had the
power to hire, fire, or promote).
Even those Justices in favor of more expansive employer liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment would decline to impose employer liability when,
unbeknownst to the employer, agents sexually harass victims who are not their direct
subordinates. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77 (Marshall,J.,joined by Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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2. Agent Liability Is Needed When Employers Are
Judgment-Proof
Even when employers are susceptible to vicarious liability under
Title VII, suing them is monetarily fruitless if they lack sufficient
funds to satisfy adversejudgments. In cases of bankrupt employers,
for example, agent liability provides the only means for potential
recovery. 6 Similarly, agent liability aids full recovery when em-
ployers are capable of only partial satisfaction of adversejudgments.
In both situations, agent liability helps realize the congressional goal
of full compensation for unlawful discrimination by giving victims
the option of suing an additional defendant who may be solvent.57
3. Agent Liability Is Needed to Encourage Litigation-Shy
Victims to Sue
In addition to doctrinal gaps and practical difficulties that may
impede victims of employment discrimination from recovering full
judgments, nonmonetary factors may discourage victims from suing
employers. Most notably, victims of discrimination may fear the
social repercussions that often accompany suits against employers.
A Title VII lawsuit might anger the supervisors and managers who
may greatly influence the victim's career-advancement opportuni-
ties, as well as offend the victim's fellow employees. Although
suits against agents might also exacerbate negative sentiments
among a victim's colleagues, agent liability may partially alleviate
this concern by providing victims a choice of defendants.59 If the
' See, e.g., EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944-46 (7th Cir. 1988) (considering
whether to hold successor corporation liable for bankrupt predecessor's obligations);
see also Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(recognizing that employment discrimination plaintiffs are sometimes unable to sue
because their employers are bankrupt).
" The need for agent liability in cases of judgment-proof employers is so
compelling that one court, after rejectingagent liability, suggested it would reconsider
the issue if the employer were shown to be "undercapitalized." See Archer v. Globe
Motorists Supply Co., 833 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recognizing a need to
pierce the corporate veil to ensure recovery for a Title VII plaintiff where an
undercapitalized employer is incapable of satisfying an adverse judgment).
' Even if the discrimination ends or prevents an employment relationship involv-
ing the victim, potential plaintiffs still have these concerns if they seek reinstatement,
see supra note 8, if they have developed friendships that may bejeopardized, or if they
anticipate business dealings with the employer or its agents in the future. Title VII
mitigates this concern to some degree by prohibiting retaliatory discharge. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
" Even if agents implead employers, presumably plaintiffs would not incur as
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agent is unpopular, for example, the victim might choose to sue the
agent exclusively, foregoing a suit against the employer.6"
Suing the agent instead of the employer may also encourage vic-
tims to sue because it would not jeopardize the ability of the
employer to stay in business and continue to supply jobs.6 Addi-
tionally, agent liability provides victims of unlawful discrimination
an opportunity to sue as a means of allocating blame. In this way,
agent liability offers victims an added incentive to file suit when
they perceive agents as more responsible than their employers for
injury.6 2 Therefore, by encouraging victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion to sue in a variety of situations, agent liability furthers the
congressional goal of redressing employment discrimination.
6
3
B. Agent Liability Probably Deters Employment Discrimination
Although agent liability certainly furthers Title VII's goal of
compensating victims of employment discrimination,
64 it is some-
what unclear how agent liability comports with the other statutory
objective of deterrence. 61 Under a regime of agent liability, Title
VII deters agents6 6 in two ways: agents fear direct exposure to
many social repercussions as if they were to sue employers directly.
'0 Congress's goal is to compensate victims in fact, not merely to provide an
opportunity for compensation that may be undesirable to victims. Cf supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing the congressional goal of compensation).
61 Suing agents is not likely to affect the financial stability of the employer. Even
when employers show a willingness to indemnify or insure agents, courts may hesitate
to permit such arrangements. Cf Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 341
(D.N.J. 1979) (forbidding an employer from compensating its agent for tort liability
incurred as a result of sexually harassing an employee, because such indemnification
would defeat the purpose of the court's discretionary award of punitive damages).
62 Agent liability also provides additional monetary incentives to sue. Although
the compensatory damage award always remains constant, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 902 (1979), the total punitive damage award increases as the number of
liable defendants increases. See id. § 908 & cmts. (explaining that punitive damages
are determined by the amount needed to punish and deter each defendant found
liable); infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
6s Encouraging victims to sue also furthers the objective of eliminating employ-
ment discrimination by deterring future discrimination. See infra part II.B (discussing
the deterrent effect of agent liability).
"See supra part II.A.
65 Compare Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439,443 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Not t]o hold
[agents liable] would encourage [them] to believe that they may violate Title VII with
impunity.") with Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993) ("An
employer that has incurred civil damages because one of its [agents] believes he [or
she] can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that [agent]'s erroneous
belief."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
' Agent liability does not alter the liability scheme for cases in which employers
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liability, and they fear employer repercussions due to the employer's
exposure to vicarious liability.6" Absent agent liability, Title VII
deters agents only indirectly through the threat of employer reper-
cussions. This observation, however, does not necessarily mean that
agent liability increases overall deterrence. Because agents partially
satisfy damage awards, employers expecting to incur less vicarious
liability might choose to deter their agents with less vigor. Unfortu-
nately, a lack of empirical data prevents a quantitative comparison
of agent liability's competing effects on deterrence. In this light,
the following subsections suggest why, nonetheless, agent liability
probably increases overall deterrence to agents.68
1. Common Sense Suggests That Agent Liability Increases
Overall Deterrence
Agent liability entails the threat of personal bankruptcy to
agents who discriminate, and commentators have recognized this
threat to be quite potent.69 In addition to being perhaps the
strongest potential deterrent under Title VII, the fear of personal
bankruptcy exists in situations in which threats of employer
repercussions are insufficient. Once their pensions vest, for exam-
ple, company managers or supervisors on the brink of retirement
are not deterred effectively by possible discharge, lower compensa-
tion, or curtailment of advancement opportunities.0 In situations
like these, direct exposure to liability may represent the only effec-
tive way to deter discrimination by agents.
themselves discriminate, because liability runs directly against the employer in these
cases. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
67 Employer repercussions for discrimination might include, for example, dis-
charge, decreased compensation, or curtailment of advancement opportunities. See
Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope
of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1988)
(identifying general techniques employers use to avoid exposure to vicarious liability);
see also Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing
the employer's policy of immediately discharging agents who violate Title VII).
" Emotional and social deterrents to agents presumably exist in equal force
regardless of Title VII's liability scheme because agents are judged violators of Title
VII without regard to whether liability runs against them. Accordingly, the analysis
of this subsection focuses on financial deterrence. Criminal penalties are not a
potential deterrent, because Title VII provides only civil remedies. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5.
69 See e.g., Sykes, supra note 67, at 567 n.9 (maintaining that potential bankruptcy
is a powerful deterrent to agents under Title VII).
" Seesupra note 67 (discussing sanctions an employer might impose for employee
misconduct).
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Furthermore, employers are likely to implement similar deter-
rent policies regardless of whether they expect to share liability with
their agents. The most severe employer repercussions, discharge
and demotion, are fairly inexpensive, 7' and the need to maintain a
good reputation in the public eye hopefully provides most employ-
ers with enough incentive to deter their agents from discriminating,
regardless of the potential for legal liability. Because agent liability
adds the deterrent of personal bankruptcy without detracting signi-
ficantly from deterrence by employers,7 2 common sense indicates
that agent liability under Title VII increases overall deterrence for
discriminating.
2. Agent Liability Increases Overall Deterrence by Increasing the
Incidence of Lawsuits, the Resulting Damage Awards,
and Undesirable Risk to Potential Defendants
In addition to creating direct exposure to liability for agents,
agent liability creates at least three additional avenues of deterrence.
First, as explained in the previous section, victims are more likely to
sue if agent liability is recognized. 73  The added incentive for
victims to litigate creates additional incentives for agents not to
discriminate, because they will more likely be held accountable for
their actions. Second, agent liability often affects the magnitude of
the damage award accompanying a finding of unlawful discrimina-
tion.74 Although the victim's injuries alone determine the compen-
satory damage award, 7 punitive damages are calculated by deter-
mining the appropriate punishment on a per-defendant basis.
76
7' Discharge and demotion do involve the expense of replacing the employee and
any expenses that might accompany a potential lawsuit by the employee against whom
repercussions are directed.
7 Although agents are not deterred directly unless they are aware of what conduct
exposes them to liability, employers have strong incentives to educate their agents
about the law so long as vicarious liability is available to plaintiffs.
' See supra part II.A.
7' Agent liability does not affect the probability of a plaintiff's success. See
Carrillo, supra note 6, at 91 (arguing that the accuracy of determining unlawful
discrimination at trial is unaffected by changes in who may be held liable for Title VII
violations).




6 See Rodgers v. Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 739 F.2d 1102, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1984) (citing deterrence as the purpose of punitive damages under Title VII), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985); Ayers v. Christiansen, 564 P.2d 458, 461 (Kan. 1977)
(measuring punitive damages by the "extent and enormity of the wrong, the intent
of the party committing it, and generally, all circumstances attending the particular
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Because punitive damages can be awarded against each liable
defendant," damage awards for Title VII generally increase as
additional defendants are found culpable. By thus increasing the
aggregate penalty for discriminating that is borne by liable defen-
dants, agent liability probably increases overall deterrence. Third,
agent liability introduces another risk to potential defendants
because defendants would be unable to predict with certainty the
fraction of the damage award they would pay if a Title VII violation
is proven. 7  Because potential defendants generally are risk
averse,79 the increased risk associated with agent liability also sug-
gests that agent liability furthers Congress's goal of deterring
employment discrimination. 0
III. AGENT LIABILITY Is GOOD PUBLIC POLICY
Public policy considerations, like analyses of legislative history,
frequently resolve statutory ambiguities."1 Part II of this Comment
considered the policy reasons leading to Title VII's enactment and
concluded that agent liability under Title VII not only helps
compensate victims of employment discrimination, but also
probably deters discriminatory conduct. This Part continues the
public policy analysis, first by showing that agent liability comports
with firmly established common-law principles, and then by
explaining why the major policy-based objections to agent liability
are unpersuasive.8
2
transaction"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 62, § 908
(discussing punitive damages).
77 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 62, § 909 ("Punitive damages
can properly be awarded against [an employer] because of an act by an agent....").
78 As used in this context, the economic concept of risk means, in essence,
uncertainty. Absent agent liability, employers always are responsible for paying the
entire damage award, so no risk exists regarding the fraction of the damage award
paid by each defendant. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2,
at 12 (4th ed. 1992) (comparing the concept of risk to utility and stating that both
include uncertainty as a component).
7 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53
(1989) (stating that it is generally realistic to assume that parties are risk averse);
POSNER, supra note 79, § 1.2, at 12 (noting that economic theory holds that "most
people are risk averse most of the time"); Sykes, supra note 67, at 595 (same).
' Although insurance reduces or eliminates risk, courts might be unwilling to
permit insurance in the context of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Kyriazi v.
Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.NJ. 1979) (forbidding employer from
compensating agents for tort liability of sexual harassment).
81 See 2B SINGER, supra note 19, § 56.01 ("Public policy considerations exert a
significant influence in the process of statutory interpretation by the courts.").
' Often, courts also look to the other major federal statutes combatting
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A. Common-Law Principles Require Personal Accountability
Courts have long appreciated the prominent role of the com-
mon law in answering questions of public policy."5 In the Title VII
context, the Supreme Court explicitly has recognized the impor-
tance and general applicability of common-law agency principles.
s4
For a multitude of reasons, the common law supports agent liability.
employment discrimination, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. V 1993), for their potential
usefulness as a source of analogy for interpreting Title VII. See, e.g., Vakharia v.
Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 785-86 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (treating the
liability schemes of Title VII and the ADEA identically); see also 2B SINGER, supra note
19, § 51.01 ("Other statutes dealing with the same subject as the one being construed
... [comprise] another form of extrinsic aid useful in deciding questions of
interpretation."). Interpretations of agent liability under the two other major
employment discrimination statutes, however, are not particularly helpful, because
courts usually look to Title VII as a guide when determining agent liability under
these two statutes. See e.g., Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F.
Supp. 579, 589 (D.S.C. 1983) (usingTitle VII interpretation in deciding agent liability
under the ADEA). To look at these decisions for guidance would therefore be
circuitous. Those courts that have looked outside the Title VII framework, however,
have not reasoned persuasively. For example, one federal district court determining
whether agent liability is available under the ADEA partially relied upon case law
holding agents liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1988). See Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp. 127, 134-35 (N.D.N.Y.
1990). This reliance was misplaced, however, because agent liability was not clearly
recognized under the Fair Labor Standards Act at the time the ADEA was enacted.
See House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 160 (M.D.N.C. 1988). Another
court decided that agent liability should be denied under the ADEA because Congress
had amended the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1988), to
include the term "agent" as a means of limiting employer liability. See Friend v.
Union Dime Say. Bank, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1307, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Such reasoning, however, is inherently flawed because Congress's intention to limit
employer liability has no apparent bearing on its intentions regarding agent liability.
Courts have seldom considered the issue of agent liability under the ADA, making
guidance from its interpretation undependable at best. SeeJohn P. Furfaro & Maury
B. Josephson, Liability of Supervisors, N.Y. L.J., Sept: 3, 1993, at 3, 27 ("Since the
passage of the ADA, there has been little litigation [on the issue of agent liability]
under it."). But see EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 581
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (upholding liability against an agent under the ADA).
I See 2B SINGER, supra note 19, § 56.03 ("[C]ommon law ... constitutes a fertile
source from which to determine public policy."); see also id. § 55.01 (stating that
looking to the common law for guidance is a "time-honored method for solving new
problems in [statutory] law").
' See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (focusing on Congress's
inclusion of "agent" in Title VII's definition of "employer"). The Meritor Court
implicitly treated Title VII violations as the functional equivalent of torts by citing to
sections of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency that deal with employer liability for torts
committed by agents. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note
3, §§ 219-237 (defining the employer-employee relationship).
AGENT LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
The Restatement (Second) of Agency contains the strongest
common-law endorsement of agent liability.s5 It remarks that,
regardless of whether vicarious liability is available, "[an] agent who
does an act otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact
that he [or she] acted at the command of the principal or on
account of the principal." 6 This provision firmly embodies the
notion of personal accountability under the law. Applied to Title
VII's liability scheme, this provision strongly supports agent liability.
Agent liability under Title VII is further supported by the two
common-law tort liability theories identified by Oliver Wendell
Holmes." Under one theory, tort liability is "a penalty for disobe-
dience ... that . . . ought only to be based upon personal fault.""
This theory, therefore, requires liability of agents who discrimi-
nate.89 The other theory identified by Holmes states that liability
should fall on the most blameworthy party.9" In the context of
employment discrimination, agents who discriminate are usually
deemed more blameworthy than their employers, who are merely vi-
cariously exposed to liability for the violations of their agents.9"
As such, recognizing employer liability without recognizing agent
liability would be anomalous as a legal doctrine. Regardless of how
the relative blame is distributed between the agent and the employ-
er, however, the agent is still more blameworthy than the victim for
the injury inflicted. As such, the blameworthiness theory of tort
liability also requires that victims be allowed to sue agents who
discriminate.
8 The Supreme Court specifically has directed lower courts to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency when assessing employer liability in cases of hostile environment
sexual harassment. See Meitor, 477 U.S. at 72.
8 6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 3, § 343 (emphasis added).
Although three exceptions to this general rule exist, none of the exceptions is appli-
cable to agent liability under Title VII. See id. (delineating exceptions to the general
rule of agent liability).
7 Holmes specifically considered justifications for imposing liability for
unintentional harms. See HOLMES, supra note 1, at 81-82. A fortiori, these
justifications also apply to intentional harms, for which an even lesser justification
would permit imposing liability on the tortfeasor.
' Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
s9 Courts implicitly recognize the highly personal nature of discrimination by
agents. See e.g., DeWald v. Amsterdam Hous. Auth., 823 F. Supp. 94, 103 (N.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding, in the sexual harassment context, that agents are only susceptible to
suit if acting independently and not as surrogates for employers).
90 See HOLMES, supra note 1, at 82.
11 But see supra part II.A.1 (discussing the potential unavailability of vicarious
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment).
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Finally, the common law generally permits employers that incur
vicarious liability to seek full indemnification from their agents. 92
This allowance clearly suggests that the common law required culpa-
ble agents, when feasible, ultimately to compensate victims for the
damages resulting from discrimination. This result is possible only
if agent liability is recognized, because parties can seek indemnifica-
tion only from those who could have been sued in the first
instance."8 Thus, all things considered, the common law strongly
rejects a liability scheme in which employers incur vicarious liability;
yet discriminating agents are not held accountable to their victims.
B. Policy Objections to Agent Liability Are Unpersuasive
Critics of agent liability under Title VII have advanced several
policy arguments suggesting its undesirability. One argument
proposes that agent liability has a "chilling effect" on employees that
encourages them to limit interactions so as to avoid exposure to
liability, thereby interfering with the efficient operation of busi-
nesses.94 Whether agent liability in fact creates a "chilling effect"
is ambiguous, however, because of agent liability's competing effects
on direct deterrence and employer deterrence, 95 and because em-
ployees do not necessarily fear lawsuits as much as they fear that
initiating lawsuits will lead to employer repercussions." Ironically,
if employees do have a greater fear of legal liability, as this argu-
ment maintains, agent liability accordingly furthers the congression-
al goal of deterrence. 7 The "chilling effect" argument, therefore,
9 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, § 51, at 341; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, supra note 62, § 886B(2)(a) (stating that indemnity may be granted in cases
in which the indemnitee is only vicariously liable for the conduct of the indemnitor).
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 62, § 886B(1).
' See, e.g., Bramesco v. Drug Computer Consultants, 834 F. Supp. 120, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[E]xposure of [agents] to personal liability may interfere with the
functions of their employers .... ."); Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., 833 F.
Supp. 211,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Congress in the public sector context has recognized
that liability of individual personnel for acts attributable to an institutional entity can
have an undesirably chilling effect on the ability of the entity to perform its
functions." (citing legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988))).
" Employers also decrease their exposure to Title VII liability if interactions
among coworkers are limited. See Conway, supra note 54, at 1177 (arguing that
vicarious liability creates employer incentives to "establish rigid policies either severely
limiting social encounters between supervisors and subordinates or prohibiting them
altogether"); cf supra part II.B (discussing the deterrent effect of agent liability).
' See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 6 (stating that one purpose of Title VII is to eliminate employ.
ment discrimination); see also supra part II.B.
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ultimately defeats itself, because in statutory construction public
policy considerations play a secondary role to legislative intent.98
Another argument maintains that agent liability under Title VII
is superfluous9 because it accomplishes nothing more than
increasing the expense of litigation.' 0 For victims of discrimina-
tion, however, suing agents is often necessary in cases involving
bankrupt employers and in cases of hostile environment sexual
harassment.'0 ' Furthermore, this argument apparently overlooks
the important nonmonetary benefits associated with bringing the
actual perpetrator into court. 0 2 The frequency with which victims
of discrimination voluntarily incur the extra cost of suing agents in
addition to the employer bespeaks the significance of this over-
sight.
103
A third argument is that agent liability under Title VII is
economically inefficient. 104 This argument first presupposes the
existence of an optimal level of deterrence and then attempts to
gauge whether agent liability produces the optimal result.10 5 Such
an approach, however, is repugnant to Congress's objective of
eliminating employment discrimination altogether. 0  Efficiency
arguments, therefore, do not pose a valid objection to agent liability
under Title VII. 1°0
98 See 2B SINGER, supra note 19, § 56.01 (discussing the role of public policy in
statutory interpretation).
' See, e.g., Bramesco v. Drug Computer Consultants, 834 F. Supp. 120, 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[Pllaintiff gains nothing [by suing agents under Title VII] apart
from consumption of time and creation of bitterness .. ").
11 Cf., e.g., Sykes, supra note 67, at 570-71 n.19 ("Also, vicarious liability adds an
additional party to litigation and thus may increase litigation costs significantly.").
101 See supra parts II.A.1-2 (discussing problems of bankrupt employers and
problems related to hostile environment sexual harassment).
" See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (identifying situations in which the victim of discrimination "seeks not
money damages but injunctive relief").
" That victims of discrimination often sue agents in addition to the employer may
alternatively signal that victims of discrimination commonly doubt the financial
stability of employers. See supra part II.A.2. This interpretation would also undercut
arguments claiming redundancy in suing both employers and agents.
1'4 Cf. Sykes, supra note 67, at 567 (arguing that employers in competitive markets
who are not vicariously liable for the torts of their agents will produce beyond the
socially optimal level).
105 See id.
'o See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that one purpose of Title VII
is to eliminate employment discrimination).
107 See 2B SINGER, supra note 19, § 56.01 (discussing the role of public policy in
statutory interpretation). Economic efficiency arguments against agent liability, even
if legitimately considered, probably should be rejected for another reason: "[E]ven
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A final policy argument, not economically based, states that
agent liability under Title VII can result in injustice when the
employer is primarily to blame for the discrimination at issue." 8 In
such cases, however, the general rule of indemnification does not
apply, because both the employer and the agent have directly
violated Title VII."'0 In these situations a rule of contribution
applies instead, whereby damages are equitably divided between the
employer and its agents."' Therefore, when fairness dictates,
damages will fall primarily or entirely on the employer."' Fur-
thermore, in the unlikely event that only agents are sued," 2 they
could simply join their employers as defendants."3 This argu-
[when] the [employer] is strictly liable, the employee's level of care will be inade-
quate" unless employees are directly exposed to statutory sanctions. A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given
the Existence of Corporate Liability, 13 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 239, 239-40 (1993).
Polinsky and Shavell base this conclusion on their assertion that employers have
"limited ability to discipline [their employees]: the effect of dismissal is limited by the
presence of alternate opportunities for employees." Id.
108 The employer is likely to be primarily to blame for the discrimination when it
directs its agents to act in a discriminatory manner. Courts currently appear
unwilling to permit agent liability in these situations. See, e.g., Bramesco v. Drug
Computer Consultants, 834 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that agents
cannot be liable for Title VII violations "absent separate intentional misconduct")
(citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1049 (1994)); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 784 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (holding that agents may be liable for Title VII violations not committed
under direction from their superiors); Archer v. Globe Motorists Supply Co., 833 F.
Supp. 211,214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that agents may be liable for "individualized
personal misconduct" separate from mandatory institutionalized policy); Bradley v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 657 F. Supp. 197,207 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that agents
cannot be liable under Title VII for following employer policy); see also Bridges v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 800 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[T]he normal rule
[is] that [agent] liability must be premised on individual acts distinct from the
organization's policy." (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985))).
'0 9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 62, § 886B (delineating the
general rules of indemnification).
"' See id. § 886A (outlining the general rules of contribution among joint
tortfeasors).
.. The commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that "a growing
number of states... base[] [contribution] according to the comparative fault of the
tortfeasors" instead of equally dividing damages. Id. § 886A, cmt. h; see also id.
§ 886A(2) ("No tortfeasor can be required to make contribution beyond his own
equitable share of the liability."); supra note 110 (citing cases in which courts have
distributed liability according to perceived fault).
11 See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1, at 5 (2d ed. 1986)
(stating that when both employers and agents are potentially liable for torts, plaintiffs
only sue employers "in the vast majority of cases").
Is See BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1109-10 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the joinder of one defendant by another). In
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ment, then, is no more convincing than the economically based
arguments opposing agent liability.
CONCLUSION
The majority of federal courts that have squarely addressed the
issue of agent liability have chosen to insulate discriminating agents
from suit," 4 thereby systematically favoring powerful company
executives11 5 over their usually less wealthy subordinates. This
result not only contravenes the American common-law tradition and
basic principles of justice, but also hinges upon improper methods
of statutory construction. A literal reading of Title VII provides a
sound basis for agent liability, and the congressional objectives of
compensation and deterrence require that agents be held account-
able for their discrimination. Agent liability affirmatively encourag-
es victims to enforce their rights and also provides the only means
of redress in situations in which employers are bankrupt and in
many instances of hostile environment discrimination. Further-
more, although it cannot be stated conclusively, agent liability
probably increases deterrence under Title VII. Public policy
objections to agent liability seem largely unfounded, especially
considering the well-established rule that a remedial statute should
be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.' 6 When
addition, Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to
relief in respect of or arising out of the same... occurrence, or series of
... occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
14 Seesupra notes 15-16 (cataloguing rulings on agent liability from federal courts
of appeals and district courts).
1' All Title VII agents are "powerful" in the sense that they must exert significant
control over decision-making processes in order to be considered agents within the
meaning of the statute. See supra note 12 (discussing the definition of "agent" under
Title VII).
"' Many court decisions state that Title VII ought to be construed liberally so as
to further Congress's purpose for enacting the legislation. See e.g., Hamilton v.
Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Title VII 'should be accorded a liberal
interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the
inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.'") (quoting
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972));
Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980) (construing liberally the term
"employer" (citing Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.
1977))); see also 3 SINGER, supra note 19, § 60.01, at 147 ("Remedial statutes are
liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy." (footnote omitted));
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construed properly, Tide VII produces the just result: the perpetra-
tors of discrimination suffer rather than their victims.
Conway, supra note 54, at 1158 ("The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to
Tide VII reveals that Congress desired the statute to be broadly construed, in order
to eliminate sex based discrimination in employment." (citation omitted)).
